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Judgment and Decision Making, Forthcoming
“Do the Right Thing” for Whom? An Experiment on Ingroup
Favouritism, Group Assorting and Moral Suasion
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Abstract
In this paper we investigate the effect of moral suasion on ingroup favouritism. We report a well-powered, pre-registered,
two-stage 2x2 mixed-design experiment. In the first stage, groups are formed on the basis of how participants answer to a
set of questions, concerning non-morally relevant issues in one treatment (assorting on non-moral preferences), and morally
relevant issues in another treatment (assorting on moral preferences). In the second stage, participants choose how to split a
given amount of money between participants of their own group and participants of the other group, first in the baseline setting
and then in a setting where they are told to do what they believe to be morally right (moral suasion). Our main results are: (i)
in the baseline, participants tend to favour their own group to a greater extent when groups are assorted according to moral
preferences, compared to when they are assorted according to non-moral preferences; (ii) the net effect of moral suasion is to
decrease ingroup favouritism, but there is also a non-negligible proportion of participants for whom moral suasion increases
ingroup favouritism; (iii) the effect of moral suasion is substantially stable across group assorting and four pre-registered
individual characteristics (gender, political orientation, religiosity, pro-life vs pro-choice ethical convictions).
Keywords: moral suasion, ingroup favouritism, dictator game, moral preferences.
1 Introduction
In the past years, behavioural scientists have provided con-
verging evidence that social behaviour in economic games
is not solely motivated by the monetary consequences of
the available actions, but it is also motivated by moral pref-
erences for doing what people think to be the right thing,
beyond the monetary consequences that this action brings
about. For example, Krupka and Weber (2013) found that
people tend to be more altruistic in the dictator game in the
“take frame”, compared to the dictator game in the “give
frame”, in spite of the fact that these two frames give rise to
monetarily equivalent decision problems;and, crucially, they
showed that this framing effect can be explained by prefer-
ences formaking the socially appropriate choice: people tend
to rate “taking from the recipient” to be more socially inap-
propriate than “not giving to the recipient”. A conceptually
similar result has been obtained for six dictator game frames
in Capraro and Vanzo (2019), where the authors found that
their framing effects can be explained by a change in the per-
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ception of what people think is the morally right thing to do.
The fact that frames can impact people’s choices by activat-
ing moral preferences is not limited to altruistic behaviour
in the dictator game. For example, Eriksson et al. (2017)
reported that moral considerations explain framing effects
in ultimatum game rejections, whereas Capraro and Rand
(2018) demonstrated that moral preferences explain framing
effects in trade-off games pitting equity against efficiency,
and drive not only altruistic behaviour in the dictator game,
but also cooperative behaviour in the prisoner’s dilemma.
Besides the empiricalwork,moral preferences have also been
formalized in several economic models (Alger and Weibull,
2013; Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Bénabou and Tirole,
2006; Della Vigna et al., 2012; Kessler and Leider, 2012;
Kimbrough and Vostroknutov, 2016; Krupka and Weber,
2013; Levitt and List, 2007; López-Pérez, 2008). And be-
sides behavioural economics, the fact that at least altruistic
giving is driven by morality has been highlighted by several
scholars, to the point that fairness is considered to be one of
foundations of morality (Graham et al., 2013; Haidt, 2012;
Haidt and Joseph, 2004).
One of the main applications of this literature on moral
preferences is the work on moral suasion. The idea is sim-
ple: if people’s behaviour is driven by moral preferences,
then making morality salient should impact people’s be-
haviour. A number of works have provided support for this
hypothesis. An earlier paper by Brañas-Garza (2007) found
that telling dictators that “the other person relies on you”
1
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increases dictator game donations towards that person. A
subsequent work by Dal Bó and Dal Bó (2014) reported that
reminders of the Golden Rule increases cooperation in an
iterated prisoner’s dilemma. More recently, Capraro et al.
(2019) showed that asking participants “What do you per-
sonally think is the morally the right thing to do?”, prior to
making their decision, increases dictator game altruism and
prisoner’s dilemma cooperation. Scholars have also started
applying moral suasion to redistribution decisions that have
consequences outside the laboratory. Capraro et al. (2019)
found that the aforementionedmoral nudge increases online
charitable donations to humanitarian organizations by 44%.
Bott et al. (2019) reported that sending moral letters to
tax payers decreases tax evasion. In sum, moral suasion is
emerging as a useful tool to nudge prosocial behaviour both
in and outside the lab.1
Here, we extend this line of literature by studying the
effect of moral suasion in dictator games in which dictators
can favour a member of their own group, at a cost to a
member of another group. This is an important case for two
reasons.
One is practical. Scholars have been studying ingroup
favouritism (and its companion, outgroup derogation) for
decades, with the underlying motivation that this is what
ultimately generates some of the lightest and, at the same
time, some of darkest expressions of human nature, democ-
racy and civil rights, on the one hand, genocides and ethnic
cleansings, on the other hand (Nowak, 2006; Puurtinen and
Mappes, 2008; Rusch, 2014; Tajfel et al., 1971; Wilson,
1975). Therefore, exploring whether and howmoral suasion
affects ingroup favouritism may have significant practical
implications.
The second reason is that theoretical predictions are, a
priori, not obvious, as we argue below.
On the one hand, ingroup favouritism is considered to be
one of the most fundamental behavioural bias among hu-
mans (Baron et al., 2013; Curry et al., 2019; Haidt, 2012).
The seminal work by Tajfel et al. (1971) found that people
discriminate between groups even when groups are assorted
through a random, irrelevant categorization (see also Tajfel
(1970); Tajfel (1974); Tajfel (1982)). Since then, ingroup
favouritism has been observed in several economic contexts,
ranging from public goods games (Krupp et al., 2008), dic-
tator games (Chen and Li, 2009; Whitt and Wilson, 2007),
charitable donation games (Pavey et al., 2011), ultimatum
games (Kubota et al., 2013; McLeish and Oxoby, 2011),
prisoner’s dilemmas (Ahmed, 2007), and response games
(Chen and Li, 2009), among many others (Everett et al.,
2015). Ingroup favouritism is so widespread that some psy-
1A related stream of literature uses descriptive and injunctive norms to
promote prosocial behaviour in the laboratory (Bicchieri and Xiao, 2009;
D’Adda et al., 2017; Krupka and Weber, 2009; Raihani and McAuliffe,
2014; Zafar, 2011) and in the field (Agerström et al., 2016; Cialdini et al.,
1991; Croson et al., 2010; Ferraro and Price, 2013; Frey and Meier, 2004;
Goldstein et al., 2008; Hallsworth et al., 2017).
chologists have come to suggest that its psychological basis,
group identity, ultimately descends from the uniquely hu-
man awareness of the inevitability of death: when people
identify with a group, they embed themselves into some-
thing greater, that ultimately outlives the individual, and
this allows the individual to reach the so-called “symbolic
immortality” (Arndt et al., 1997; Becker, 2007; Harmon-
Jones et al., 1996). Important for our work is that ingroup
favouritism is widespread also as a moral rule: “help your
group” has been recently found to be a universal moral rule
across 60 societies (Curry et al., 2019). This is consistent
with the morality-as-cooperation theory (Curry, 2016), as
well as with moral foundations theory, according to which
ingroup favouritism represents one of the fundamental di-
mensions of morality (Graham et al., 2013; Haidt, 2012;
Haidt and Joseph, 2004).
Therefore, this line of literature suggests that moral sua-
sion might increase ingroup favouritism, bymaking it salient
that the right thing to do is to help your group.
Alternatively, it is possible that the effect of moral sua-
sion on ingroup favouritism is not domain-general, but it
depends on specific factors such as the decision context and
the individual characteristics of the decision maker. In this
paper, we focus on one contextual factor and four individual
characteristics.
Among the contextual factors, the way the groups are as-
sorted is likely to affect the strength of ingroup favouritism
and, ultimately, the effect of moral suasion. For example,
if people are grouped according to characteristics that are
central to their identity, it is likely that they would display
more ingroup bias, compared to situations in which they
are grouped according to less central characteristics; this
might have the effect that moral suasion increases ingroup
favouritism in cases in which participants are assorted ac-
cording to characteristics that generate a strong group iden-
tity, while leaving it unaffected, or even decreasing it, when
participants are assorted according to characteristics that
generate a weaker group identity. What characteristics are
central to people’s identity? Previous work has shown that
people consider theirmoral traits to be themost essential part
of their identity, even more so than emotional and autobio-
graphical memory (Strohminger and Nichols, 2014). Addi-
tionally, morality is the first characteristic that people use to
form impressions and evaluate others (Goodwin et al., 2014;
Wojciszke et al., 1998). This suggests that it is possible
that assorting participants according to their moral prefer-
ences would generate a stronger group identity compared to
when participants are assorted according to non-moral pref-
erences; and this difference in group identity would translate
into a difference in ingroup favouritism and the effect of
moral suasion on ingroup favouritism.
Coming to the individual characteristics, there are many
that, in principle, might play a role. To select some, we took
a pragmatic approach. Since we planned to conduct our ex-
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periment on Prolific and since Prolific allows experimenters
to download some individual characteristics of the partici-
pants, we checked, prior to the experiment, the list of all the
individual characteristics that were available for download
and we selected those that we believed to be potentially rel-
evant. In doing so, we selected four characteristics: gender,
political orientation, religiosity, and pro-life vs pro-choice
ethical convictions. We chose gender because previous re-
search has found that males tend to display greater levels
of social dominance orientation than females do (Sidanius
et al., 1994), and social dominance orientation is known to
be predictive of various forms of outgroup derogation, in-
cluding racism (Sidanius and Pratto, 1993). A related line
of work suggests that between-groups competition might be
evolved especially among men, because it allowed men to
gain access to mates and other resources (McDonald et al.,
2012; Vugt et al., 2007). Therefore, it is possible that men
display more ingroup favouritism and this could be even
strengthened by moral suasion. We chose political orienta-
tion because previous work suggests the existence of a “prej-
udice gap” between conservatives and liberals (Chambers
et al., 2013), with conservatives being more intolerant to-
wards outgroups than liberals (see Sibley and Duckitt, 2008,
for a meta-analysis). Consequently, it is possible that moral
suasion decreases ingroup favouritism for liberals, while in-
creasing it for conservatives. For similar reasons, we chose
religiosity and pro-life vs pro-choice ethical convictions, be-
ing typically correlated with political conservatism (Malka
et al., 2012). See also Enke et al. (2019).
Following this line of thoughts, we designed, pre-
registered, and conducted a well-powered (N=502), 2×2
mixed-design experiment, in which the first, between-
subjects, factor represents the way the groups are assorted
(according to moral vs non-moral preferences), while the
second, within-subject, factor represents the way people are
asked tomake dictator game decisions between individuals in
their own group and individuals in the other group (baseline
vs under moral suasion). We chose to use a within subject
design for the dictator game decisions in order to be able
to categorize participants in three types: those who, in re-
sponse to moral suasion, discriminate more between groups;
those who, in response to moral suasion, discriminate less
between groups; those who, in response to moral suasion,
do not change their strategy. This subdivision in types can
help us shed light on the heterogeneity on people’s moral
preferences.2
2Implementing a within-subject design comes also with some costs.
On the one hand, the effect of moral suasion might decrease, because a
within-subject design introduces demand for consistency (Samuelson and
Zeckhauser, 1988); on the other hand, the effect of moral suasion might
increase, due to experimenter demand effect. However, we believe this
last issue to be less relevant in our case, because “demand effects refer
to changes in behaviour due to cues about what constitutes appropriate
behaviour” (Zizzo, 2010); therefore, people who change donation because
of demand effect are still following a norm.
In a nutshell, our main results are: (i) participants tend
to favour their own group to a greater extent when groups
are assorted according to moral preferences, compared to
when they are assorted according to non-moral preferences;
(ii) the net effect of moral suasion is to decrease ingroup
favouritism, but there is also a non-negligible proportion
of participants for whom moral suasion increases ingroup
favouritism; (iii) the effect of moral suasion is substantially
stable across group assorting and the four individual charac-
teristics under consideration.
2 Method
We conducted an online 2×2 experiment on Prolific (Palan
and Schitter, 2018), implemented in oTree (Chen et al.,
2016). We recruited 502 participants living in the US at
the time of the experiment. In the first stage of the exper-
iment, participants were randomly assigned to one of two
treatments designed to group together individuals with sim-
ilar stated preferences. In one treatment, preferences are
collected as answers to questions on issues that are morally
relevant; in the other treatment, preferences are collected as
answers to questions on issues that are not morally relevant.
In the second stage, each participant played a randomized
sequence of three variants of the dictator game (DG) in two
distinct settings: the baseline setting and the moral sua-
sion setting. The DG is a non-strategic game, where the
decision-maker, the dictator, has to decide how to split a
certain amount of money between herself and the receiver.
In our study, the decision maker has to decide how to split
100 points (in 10-points increments) between a given pair
of recipients. In the next subsections, we describe the ex-
periment in more details. Full experimental instructions are
reported in Appendix A.
2.1 Stage 1: Group Formation
In the first stage of the experiment, participants were ran-
domly assigned to one of the two treatments: the “moral
assorting” (250 participants) and the “non-moral assorting”
(252 participants) treatments. In the moral assorting treat-
ment, participants answered five questions concerningmoral
issues (see Appendix A) and had to indicate if they believe
these issues are morally acceptable, morally wrong or if
they have no opinion. In the non-moral assorting treatment,
participants were asked their preferences on five non-moral
issues (see Appendix A). For each subject, her own group
was defined as the set of participants who answered in the
same way as she did to at least three out of the five questions,
with the remaining participants forming the other group.
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2.2 Stage 2: Dictator Games
In the second stage of the experiment, participants played
DGs in two distinct settings with fixed order: first in the
“baseline” setting and then in the “moral suasion” setting. In
the baseline, each participant had to decide how to split 100
points in three different randomized DGs. In the first DG
(which we call “DG own”), each participant had to divide
points between herself and a randomly pickedmember of her
own group. In the second DG (which we call “DG other”),
each participant had to divide points between herself and a
randomly picked member of the other group. In the third
DG (which we call “DG own-other”), each participant had
to divide points between a randomly picked member of her
own group and a randomly pickedmember of the other group.
After this, participants played in the moral suasion setting.
Here, participants faced the same threeDGs described above,
but before allocating points they were told: “do what you
think is morally right”.
Lastly, participants were asked comprehension questions.
We refer to Appendix A for full experimental instructions.
After collecting all the data, participants were randomly
assigned to the role of decision-maker or receiver. Then
one of the DGs was randomly selected and subjects were
paired according to the selected DG. Participants received a
payment according to their role in that particular DG. This
payment methodology implies that all decisions have an im-
pact on both the decision maker and the recipient. On av-
erage, participants gained 0.61 GBP, including the show-up
fee (0.40 GBP).
2.3 Measures of Ingroup Favouritism
We operationalize ingroup favouritism through two different
individual-levelmeasures. Onemeasure is constructed start-
ing from the DGs in which the decision-maker is affected by
her decision (the “DG own” and the “DG other”). Specif-
ically, this measure is computed as the difference between
how much a dictator gives to a randomly picked member
of her own group and how much she gives to a randomly
picked member of the other group. We call this measure
costly ingroup favouritism. Note that this is different from
the notion of parochial altruism, which requires the action to
be (i) costly to the decision-maker, (ii) beneficial for the deci-
sion maker’s ingroup, and (iii) costly for outgroupmembers,
all at the same time (Böhm et al., 2018; Choi and Bowles,
2007). In particular, costly ingroup favouritism does not
necessarily involve harming outgroup members; it might be
the case that a dictator still gives some amount to outgroup
members, but less compared to ingroup members. We also
consider a measure of costless ingroup favouritism, whereby
helping one’s own group does not cost anything to the de-
cision maker. This measure is constructed starting from the
DG in which the dictator is not affected by her decision
(“DG own-other”). Specifically, this measure is computed
as the difference between 50 (the equal split) and how much
a dictator gives to a randomly picked member of the other
group.
2.4 Research questions
We pre-registered three research questions:
1. Does assorting based on moral preferences generate
more ingroup favouritism than assorting based on non-
moral preferences?
2. Does moral suasion mitigate ingroup favouritism?
3. Does moral suasion affect ingroup favouritism differ-
ently when group assorting is based on moral pref-
erences compared to when it is based on non-moral
preferences?
Furthermore, we pre-registered that we would test the role
of: gender, political orientation, religiosity, pro-life vs pro-
choice ethical convictions. The pre-registration is available
at: https://aspredicted.org/k4r34.pdf.
3 Results
Our first research question is whether assorting based on
moral preferences generates more ingroup favouritism com-
pared to the case where assorting is based on non-moral
preferences. Figure 1 suggests that, on average, the an-
swer is positive for both measures of ingroup favouritism.
Wilcoxon rank-sum test confirms this finding. When assort-
ing is based on moral preferences, the average of the costly
ingroup favouritism measure is 3.05 points greater than it is
when assorting is based on non-moral preferences, Z=-2.52,
p=.011 (left chart). A similar result holds for the costless
ingroup favouritism measure. In the moral treatment, the
average of the costly ingroup favouritism measure is 4.83
points greater than it is in the non-moral treatment, Z=-3.35,
p<.001 (right chart).
The second research question is whether moral suasion
mitigates ingroup favouritismcompared to the baseline. Fig-
ure 2 suggests that, on average, the answer is positive for
both measures of ingroup favouritism. Wilcoxon rank-sum
test confirms this finding. In the baseline, the average of
the costly ingroup favouritism measure is 3.13 points higher
than it is under moral suasion Z=3.13, p<.001 (left chart).
A similar result holds for the costless ingroup favouritism
measure. In the baseline, the average of the costless ingroup
favouritism measure is 5.28 points higher than it is under
moral suasion Z(502)=5.37, p<.001 (right chart). Splitting
the effect of moral suasion by DG decision, we find that
moral suasion increases prosociality both in “DG own” and
“DG other” (linear regression: t = 4.47, p < .001; t = 4.61,
p < .001). However, the increase of prosociality in “DG
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Figure 1: Ingroup favouritism is stronger when assort-
ing is based on moral preferences, compared to when it
is based on non-moral preferences. The average of the
costly ingroup favouritism measure in the moral treatment
(M=6.94, SD=12.27) is 3.05 points points higher than it is in
the non-moral one (M=3.89, SD=16.57) (left chart). The aver-
age of the costless ingroup favouritism measure in the moral
treatment (M=12.3, SD=20.37) is 4.83 points higher than it is
in the non-moral one (M=7.46, SD= 15.69) (right chart).
other” is even greater (t = 6.40, p < .001), and this is ulti-
mately the reason why, on average, moral suasion attenuates
ingroup favouritism.
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Figure 2: Ingroup favouritism is weaker under moral
suasion compared to the baseline. The average of the
costly ingroup favouritism measure under moral suasion
(M=3.84, 12.95) is 3.13 points lower than it is in the base-
line (M=6.97, SD= 16.02) (left chart). The average of the
costless ingroup favouritism measure under moral suasion
(M=7.23, SD=16.22) is 5.28 points lower than it is in the base-
line (M=12.51, SD=19.89) (right chart).
The fact that, on average, moral suasion decreases in-
group favouritism does not imply that moral suasion has
the effect of decreasing ingroup favouritism for all the par-
ticipants. In fact, we now use the within-subject factor to
show that there are three non-negligible types of participants,
which characteristically differ on how they react tomoral sua-
sion. In the first type we include participants who increased
their ingroup favouritism under moral suasion (persuaded
parochialists: ingroup favouritism under moral suasion is
higher than ingroup favouritism in the baseline3). In the sec-
ond type we classify participants who decrease their ingroup
favouritism under moral suasion (persuaded universalists:
ingroup favouritism under moral suasion is lower than in-
group favouritism in the baseline). In the third type we cate-
gorize participantswho do not change behaviour undermoral
suasion (unpersuaded: ingroup favouritism undermoral sua-
sion is equal to ingroup favouritism in the baseline). Table 1
reports the proportionsof these different behavioural types in
each treatment and using both the costly and costless ingroup
favouritism measures. Across treatments and measures, the
majority of participants is unpersuaded (on average, 72.2%),
a substantial proportion is persuaded universalist (on aver-
age, 20.5%), and, interestingly, a smaller but non-negligible
proportion is persuaded parochialist (on average, 7.3%). To
provide further evidence that persuaded parochialist are not
driven by error, we distinguish persuaded parochialists in the
costly setting from those of the costless setting. In particular,
we construct two variables: one takes value 1 if a partici-
pant is classified as persuaded parochialist according to the
costly ingroup favouritism measure, and 0 otherwise; and
the other is analgously defined by using the costless ingroup
favouritism measure. Pearson’s Chi-squared test shows that
these two variables are not independent (p < .001). Since
these measures have been collected separately, this suggests
that they are sensitive to the same causal factor.
Table 1: Frequencies of the different types using costly and
costless ingroup favouritism measures, across treatments.
Costly Costless
Treatment Non-Moral Moral Non-Moral Moral
Persuaded Parochialists 8.3% 8.4% 6.3% 6.0%
Persuaded Universalists 19.8% 16.0% 24.6% 21.6%
Unpersuaded 71.8% 75.6% 69.1% 72.4%
Note. Persuaded parochialists: participants who increase in-
group favouritism under moral suasion, compared to the base-
line. Persuaded universalists: participants who decrease in-
group favouritism under moral suasion, compared to the base-
line. Unpersuaded: participants who do not change ingroup
favouritism under moral suasion, compared to the baseline.
We now move to the third research question, whether
3In this caseweuse thewordparochialism, because persuaded parochial-
ists actually act in a way that is costly to outgroup members, compared to
the baseline. Therefore, all three properties listed by Böhm et al. (2018)
that classify parochial decisions are satisfied.
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there is any difference in how moral suasion affects in-
group favouritism in the two treatments, i.e., when assort-
ing is based on moral preferences and when it is based
on non-moral ones. Figure 3 reports the difference in in-
group favouritism under moral suasion and the baseline,
across treatments and measures. Mixed-design ANOVA
predicting ingroup favouritism as a function of group as-
sorting, moral suasion, and their interaction, shows no sig-
nificant interaction, both for the costly ingroup favouritism
measure (F = 0.25, p = 0.620) and for the costless one
(F = 0.25, p = 0.617). This result is confirmed if we use the
rank-sum test. Using both measures of ingroup favouritism,
we find that the effect of moral suasion is substantially stable
across group assorting (costly measure: Z=-.90, p=.36; cost-
less measure: Z=-.59, p=.55). Table 2 reports the fractions
of participants for whom the ingroup favouritism measure
is strictly greater than 0, across measures and treatments.
Again we find that the effect of moral suasion is substan-
tially stable across treatments, as confirmed bymixed-design
ANOVA,which reports a non-significant interaction between
group assorting and moral suasion (costly measure: F=1.96,
p= 0.1618; costless measure: F=0.95, p= 0.3297).
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Figure 3: The effect of moral suasion on ingroup
favouritism is substantially stable across group assort-
ing. The reduction in the costly ingroup favouritism measure
due to moral suasion in the moral treatment is not signifi-
cantly different from its reduction in the non-moral treatment
(left chart, p-value= .36). The reduction in the costless in-
group favouritismmeasure due to moral suasion in the moral
treatment is not significantly different from its reduction in the
non-moral treatment (right chart, p-value= .55). Error bars
represent 95% CI.
Finally, we ask whether the differential effect of moral
suasion depends on the four pre-registered individual char-
acteristics that we could download from Prolific: gender,
political orientation, religiosity, and pro-life vs pro-choice
ethical convictions. To do so we coded 4 dummy vari-
ables: gender, 1 if female and 0 if male; liberal, 1 if Liberal
and 0 if Conservative/Moderate; no_religious, 1 if agnostic,
atheist or no religious, and 0 if religious; prochoice, 1 if
a participant reports to have pro-choice ethical convictions
and 0 if a participant reports to have pro-life ethical convic-
tions. Table 3 reports average characteristics of participants
by treatments and types. The type subdivision is substan-
tially stable across treatments and individual characteristics.
Females, liberals, no religious and pro-choice people tend
to be slightly more represented among persuaded universal-
ists than they are among persuaded parochialists. However,
the only statistically significant difference is that persuaded
universalists are less religious than persuaded parochialists,
Z(61)=-2.69, p=.007. Therefore, we conclude that the ef-
fect of moral suasion is substantially stable across the four
individual characteristics that we considered.
We also tested the effect of the four individual character-
istics on baseline levels of ingroup favouritism. For each
individual characteristics, we used mixed-design ANOVA
predicting ingroup favouritism as a function of assorting,
moral suasion, the individual characteristics, and all their
two- and three-way interactions. The three-way interaction
is significant only in the case of liberal and only for the
costly ingroup favouritism measure (F = 3.08, p = 0.04).
However, the interaction between being liberal and group
assorting is strongly significant for both measures (costly:
F = 8.12, p = 0.004; costless: F = 7.11, p = 0.007).
The positive coefficient suggests that ingroup favouritism is
maximum among liberals assorted according to their moral
preferences. Regarding the effect of religiosity,we find that it
marginally significantly interacts with moral suasion (costly:
F = 3.37, p = 0.067; costless: F = 3.53, p = 0.061),
and it significantly interacts with moral assorting, but only
in the case of the costless measure (F = 4.10, p = 0.043).
Regarding the effect of pro-life vs pro-choice ethical convic-
tions, we found only a marginally significant interactionwith
group assorting and only for the costly measure (F = 3.34,
p = 0.068). Finally, regarding the effect of gender, we found
no significant interactions (all p’s > 0.1).
4 Discussion
The interest in moral suasion stems, at least in part, from
being a cheap and possibly effective policy tool that could
be applied to foster prosocial behaviours. While the liter-
ature on moral behaviour has so far produced a substantial
body of evidence showing the effectiveness of moral sua-
sion, its dependence on the identity of the recipients of the
decision-maker’s actions is far less studied, leaving open
the possibility that individuals react to moral suasion by re-
ducing prosociality towards some types of recipients. This
paper has addressed this issue in the setting of a decision to
split a given amount of money between members of one’s
own group and members of another group, providing exper-
imental evidence that, on average, moral suasion increases
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Table 2: Percentages of participants for which the ingroup favouritism measure is strictly greater than 0, across treatments
and ingroup favouritism measures.
Costly Costless
Treatment Baseline Moral Suasion Difference Baseline Moral Suasion Difference
Non-Moral 24.9% 11.3% 13.6% 36.7% 17.5% 19.2%
Moral 27.7% 20.0% 7.7% 43.5% 28.6% 14.9%
Table 3: Average of different groups’ characteristics in the
non-moral and moral treatments.
Persuaded parochialist Persuaded universalist Unpersuaded
Treatment Non-Moral Moral No-Moral Moral Non-Moral Moral
Gender 0.55 0.52 0.60 0.65 0.59 0.53
Liberal 0.53 0.37 0.43 0.58 0.58 0.59
No Religious 0.62 0.43 0.70 0.78 0.65 0.62
Pro Choice 0.83 0.76 0.84 0.86 0.82 0.75
Note. Gender: 1 if female; 0 if male. Liberal: 1 if Liberal; 0 if Conserva-
tive/Moderate. No religious:1 if agnostic, atheist or no religion; 0 if religious. Pro
Choice: 1 if pro-choice ethical convictions; 0 if pro-life ethical convictions.
pro-sociality towards both the ingroup and the outgroup;
however, the increase towards the outgroup is greater than
the increase towards the ingroup, and this results in the fact
that ingroup favouritism, on average, declines under moral
suasion. This effect exists when groups are defined in terms
of similarity with respect to answers to both non-morally
relevant questions and morally relevant questions, even if,
in the latter case, the initial level of ingroup favouritism is
higher. We would like to stress that we are not suggesting
that moral assorting is qualitatively different fromnon-moral
assorting. The fact that moral assorting generates stronger
initial ingroup favouritism compared to non-moral assorting
is likely to be driven by the fact that moral assorting makes
group identity quantitatively stronger. What is important
to note, instead, is that the negative effect of moral suasion
on ingroup favouritism holds on average. When we look at
how participants change their decision in response to moral
suasion, we find that there is a small, but non-negligible, pro-
portion of participants who increase their level of ingroup
favouritism. Finally, the effect of moral suasion appears to
be substantially stable across four (pre-registered) individual
characteristics: gender, political orientation, religiosity, pro-
choice vs pro-life ethical convictions. The only significant
effect is that persuaded universalists tend to be less religious
than persuaded parochialists. These findings have poten-
tial applications outside the laboratory, as they suggest that
making the morality of an action salient might be a practi-
cal and effective tool for decreasing ingroup favouritism, on
average, while also having the drawback of actually increas-
ing ingroup favouritism for a non-negligible proportion of
participants.
This study also relates to research exploringwhethermoral
assorting affects ingroup favouritism. Parker and Janoff-
Bulman (2013) showed that when people are assorted ac-
cording to their preferences on abortion, then they report
feeling stronger positive ingroup emotions and negative out-
group emotions, compared to when they are assorted ac-
cording to whether they prefer the Red Sox or the Yankees
(this study was conducted in Massachussets, were the rivalry
between these two teams is particularly strong). Weisel and
Böhm (2015) divided people in groups according to their
preferences about football clubs vs political parties and found
that people actively harm outgroupmembers only in the case
in which assorting is based on political preferences. Our
work is conceptually in line with this literature as our first
result shows that people display greater ingroup favouritism
when they are assorted according to moral preferences, com-
pared to when they are assorted according to non-moral pref-
erences.
This is the first study investigating the effect of moral
suasion on ingroup favouritism. As such, it does have
several limitations that might suggest directions for future
research. First, we focused on only one contextual factor
that might impact the effect of moral suasion on ingroup
favouritism: assorting according to moral preferences. Fu-
ture work should explore how moral suasion affects ingroup
favouritism when group assorting is based on other charac-
teristics that are likely to activate a strong group identity. For
example, scholars agree that ingroup favouritism is rooted in
our evolutionary tribal past (Fu et al., 2012; Masuda and Fu,
2015; Nowak, 2006; Puurtinen and Mappes, 2008; Rusch,
2014; Wilson, 1975). This suggests that characteristics that
provide group advantages (e.g., language) might be better
candidates than characteristics that primarily provide indi-
vidual advantages (e.g., skill specialization). Such an in-
vestigation could lead to identify specific cases where moral
suasion is particularly effective, and possibly others where
it delivers undesirable effects. Another potential variable
of interest is the mode of cognition – whether decisions are
made under “system 1” (often referred to as intuition) or
“system 2” (often referred to as deliberation) (Evans and
Judgment and Decision Making, Forthcoming “Do the Right Thing” for Whom? 8
Stanovich, 2013). One study found that promoting intuition
favours ingroup favouritism (DeDreu et al., 2015); twomore
found that promoting intuition favours cooperation with out-
group members (Everett et al., 2017; Rand et al., 2015). See
Capraro (2019) for a review. Consequently, it is possible that
the effect of moral suasion on ingroup favouritism is mod-
erated, or even mediated, by the mode of cognition. Future
work should explore this possibility. A similar limitation
regards individual characteristics. In this work we focused
on gender, political orientation, religiosity, and pro-life vs
pro-choice ethical convictions. The results suggest that the
effect of moral suasion is substantially stable across these
characteristics. Future work should explore the role of other
personal characteristics. Another limitation regards the fact
that our results are based on a laboratory experiment. Since
moral suasion potentially represents a very practical tool for
policy interventions, a key direction for future work is to test
the external validity of our findings.
In sum, we studied the effect of moral suasion on ingroup
favouritism. Our main results are: (i) in the baseline, par-
ticipants tend to favour their own group to a greater extent
when groups are assorted according to moral preferences,
compared to when they are assorted according to non-moral
preferences; (ii) the net effect of moral suasion is to decrease
ingroup favouritism, but there is also a non-negligible pro-
portion of participants for whommoral suasion increases in-
group favouritism; (iii) the effect ofmoral suasion is substan-
tially stable across group assorting and four pre-registered
individual characteristics (gender, political orientation, reli-
giosity, pro-life vs pro-choice ethical convictions). Future
work should test the effect of other contextual factors and
individual characteristics.
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Appendix: Experimental instructions
Group Formation
Participants were randomly divided into two treatments. We
report the instructions for both treatments.
Assorting based on Moral preferences:
Below you see a list of issues. For each one of them,
regardless of whether or not you think it should be legal,
please indicate whether you personally believe that in
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general it is morally acceptable, morally wrong or if you
have no opinion:
• Abortion: Morally Acceptable/Morally Wrong/No
Opinion;
• Doctor assisted suicide: Morally Acceptable/Morally
Wrong/No Opinion;
• Death penalty: Morally Acceptable/MorallyWrong/No
Opinion;
• Gay or lesbian relations: Morally Acceptable/Morally
Wrong/No Opinion;
• Prostitution: Morally Acceptable/Morally Wrong/No
Opinion.
Assorting based on Non-Moral preferences:
Below you see a list of questions. For each one of them,
please indicate which option you personally prefer, or if you
have no opinion.
• Where do you prefer to go during vacation?
Sea/Mountain/No Opinion;
• Where do you prefer to watch movies? Movie The-
ater/Home/No Opinion;
• Where do you prefer to do physical activity?
Gym/Outdoor/No Opinion;
• Which social network do you prefer? Insta-
gram/Facebook/No Opinion;
• Which animal do you prefer? Dog/Cat/No Opinion.
Here participants moved to the next screen.
Two groupswill be formed,YOURGROUP and the OTHER
GROUP, using the answers that you and the other participants
have given so far. YOUR GROUP is formed by you and
by those participants with answers most similar to yours.
OTHER GROUP is formed by the remaining participants,
those with answers least similar to yours.
Ingroup Favouritism
Here participants faced three randomizedDG in the baseline
setting.
In the next screens, you will make a number of decisions
about how to divide 100 Points between two participants,
drawn from either YOUR GROUP, the OTHER GROUP or
both. Once the survey is over, payments will be determined
according to either one of the decisions you made or one of
the decisions made by another participant that involves you.
100 Points correspond to payment of 0.50 GBP.
• You have to allocate Points between YOU and another
member of YOUR GROUP.
• You have to allocate Points betweenYOUand amember
of the OTHER GROUP.
• You have to allocate Points between a member of
YOURGROUP (not you) and a member of the OTHER
GROUP.
Here all participants faced three randomized DG in the
moral suasion setting.
In the next decisions, you have to decide how to divide Points
according to what you think is morally right.
• You have to allocate Points between YOU and an-
other member of YOUR GROUP. Do what you think is
morally right.
• You have to allocate Points betweenYOUand amember
of the OTHER GROUP. Do what you think is morally
right.
• You have to allocate Points between a member of
YOURGROUP (not you) and a member of the OTHER
GROUP. Do what you think is morally right.
Here the comprehension questions.
• What is the decision that lets you obtain the highest
payment?
• What is the decision that lets the other participant obtain
the highest payment?
• What is the decision that lets you and the other partici-
pant obtain the same payment?
